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Various pevious studies on Islamophobia have largely utilized Western 
perspectives. This occurrs owing to Islam and Muslims being a minority group 
that is considered a threat to the majority. This article discusses the delivery of 
Islamophobic hate speech via social media in the context of Indonesia, where the 
majority of the population are Muslims. The study found that Islamophobia on 
social media may be understood as a reaction against speeches by Islamic religious 
figures discrediting Christianity. Such Islamophobic articulation is considered 
a freedom of opinion, which is constructed on the ground of religion-based 
political polarization. Subsequently, this study brings into the literature a new 
understanding of Islamophobia within the context of Muslims as the majority 
and of netizens’ activities on social media in Indonesia. The research data were 
obtained by observing Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter timelines 
containing Islamophobic hate speech that went viral on social media. 
Berbagai penelitian sebelumnya tentang Islamophobia sebagian besar telah 
memanfaatkan perspektif Barat. Artikel ini mendiskusikan penyampaian ujaran 
kebencian Islamophobia melalui media sosial dalam konteks Indonesia sebagai 
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negara yang mayoritas penduduknya penganut agama Islam (muslim). Penelitian 
ini menemukan bahwa Islamophobia di media sosial dapat dipahami sebagai 
reaksi terhadap ceramah dari pemuka agama Islam yang mendeskriditkan Kristen. 
Penyampaian Islamophobia tersebut dianggap sebagai kebebasan berpendapat 
yang dibentuk berdasarkan polarisasi politik berbasis agama. Sehingga, penelitian 
ini berkontribusi terhadap pemahaman baru tentang Islamophobia dalam konteks 
muslim sebagai mayoritas dan aktivitas netizen di media sosial di Indonesia. Data 
penelitian diperoleh dari pengamatan terhadap media social seperti Facebook, 
Instagram, YouTube dan Twitter yang memuat ujaran kebencian tentang 
Islamophobia yang viral di media social. 
Keywords: Hate speech; islamophobia; social media; freedom of expression; identity 
politics
Introduction
The phenomenon known as Islamophobia appeared in the Western society 
and political tradition as a form of dominant presupposition regarding 
Islam.1 Islamophobia subsequently expanded as an early symptom of 
hatred against Islam in the West.2 The 9/11 incident is often referred to 
as a trigger in the rise of Islamophobia in the West.3 The incident has 
induced fear of global terrorist movements perpetrated by a number of 
people of Muslim faith. Nevertheless, prior to the 9/11 incident, various 
negative presuppositions against Islam had already emerged.
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, Islamophobia, in its most extreme 
definition as hatred against Islam, did not initially emerge as a disturbing 
phenomenon. However, various literatures explain that since the Bali 
1Scott Poynting and Linda Briskman, “Islamophobia in Australia: From Far-Right 
Deplorables to Respectable Liberals”, Social Sciences, Volume 7, Number 11 (2018), 1-17.
2Marc Hebling, Islamophobia in the West; Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, 
London: Routledge, 2014.
3Carmen Aguilera Carnerero and Abdul Halik Azeez, “Islamonausea, not Islamophobia: 
The Many Faces of Cyber Hate Speech”, Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, Volume 9, 
Number 1 (2016), 21-40. 
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bombing incident in 2002, Islamophobic symptoms have started to emerge 
throughout Indonesia.4 The emerging phenomenon of Islamophobia may 
be recognized as fear toward a group of Muslims who have an erroneous 
understanding of Islam. Even so, the existing Islamophobic phenomenon 
has yet to reach the most extreme act of Islamophobia, which is the act of 
hating and insulting Islam as a religion.
Islamophobia in Indonesia has been on the rise as of late in various 
activities through numerous social media channels such as Facebook, 
Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. The Islamophobic phenomenon in the 
activities of netizens via the various social media platforms have become 
highly unsettling as it is beginning to head toward the most extreme form 
of Islamophobia, hating and insulting the religion of Islam. 
Social media has subsequently evolved into a means for spreading 
Islamophobia in Indonesia.5 Therefore, given that Indonesia is a country 
with the largest Muslim population in the world, the presence of social 
media serves as a very specific context for the expansion of Islamophobia. 
The proliferation of Islamophobia on social media is also witnessed in 
America,6  Eropa,7  and Australia.8 
The propagation of Islamophobia through social media may have been 
4P. Ari Subagyo, “Representasi Frame dalam Latar Belakang Wacana Tajuk tentang 
Terorisme”, Litera, Volume 15, Number 1 (2016), 173-188.
5Khoirul Amin, Mohamad Dziqie Aulia Alfarauqi, and Khusnul Khatimah, “Social 
Media, Cyber Hate and Racism”, Komuniti: Jurnal Komunikasi dan Teknologi Informasi, 
Volume 10, Number 1 (2018), 3-10.
6Khaled A. Beydoun, American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear, 
Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018.
7Fabio Perocco, “Anti-Migrant Islamophobia in Europe: Social Roots, Mechanisms 
and Actors”, REMHU: Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana, Volume 26, Number 
53 (2018), 25-40. See olso: Engy Abdelkader,“A Comparative Analysis of European 
Islamophobia: France, UK, Germany, Netherlands  and Sweden”,  UCLA Journal of 
Islamic and Near Eastern Law, Volume 16, Number 1 (2017), 29-63.
8Rachel Woodlock, “Identity and Islamophobia: An Australian Investigation”, in 
Douglas Pratt and Rachel Woodlock (ed), Fear of Muslims? International Perspectives 
on Islamophobia, Switzerland: Springer, 2016: 131-151.
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brought about by the advent of communication technology inducing changes in 
the pattern of every individual’s consumption and distribution of information. 
As a result, social media themselves are becoming difficult to articulate. It may 
be identified through the features its channels maintain so that the direction 
of the messages may be identified.9 Social media may also refer to a specific 
application as its platform in order to demonstrate the differences in its model of 
interaction.10 Additionally, through social media a netizen is afforded free reign 
to convey expressions of hatred with Islam-hating contents due to differences 
in their utilization of the social media. This includes the impacts generated by 
individuals with social support behind them and those without any social support 
whatsoever from the surrounding environment. This means that Islamophobic 
contents are disseminated via social media by the perpetrators because they feel 
there is no control from the surrounding environment.11 
Thus, there are three interrelated elements discussed in this article. 
First, about Islamophobia in numerous concepts such as fear, stereotype, 
prejudice, and racism; second, about the activities of Indonesian netizens 
on social media with Islamophobic contents; and third, the specific context 
that covers Islamophobia and the activities of Indonesian netizens on 
social media. By referring to these three elements, this article has made 
the following problem statement: How can we understand Islamophobic 
hate speech delivered via social media in Indonesia?
In the context of Indonesia today, there is a relevant need to study 
Islamophobia on social media. Aside from the lack of research on 
9Michael L. Kent, “Directions in Social Media for Professional and Scholars”, in R.L. 
Heath (ed), Handbook of Public Realitions, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2010: 643-656.
10Philip N. Howard and Malcolm. R. Parks, “Social Media and Political Change: Capacity, 
Constraint, and Consequence”, Journal of Communication, Volume 62, Number 2 (2012): 
359-362.
11Kiesler Bessiere,  et al., “Effects of Internet Use and Social Resources on Changes in 
Depression, Information, Communication Society”, Information, Communication & Society, 
Volume 11, Number 1 (2008), 47–70.
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Islamophobia on social media, Indonesia is currently a democratic country 
with a Muslim majority and as such, the state guarantees to provide freedom 
of expression for its citizens. As a country with a population of Muslim 
majority, Islamophobia is also a threat to Islam’s peaceful countenance.
The rise of Islamophobia
Islamophobia is a term that is formed by combining two words, Islam and 
phobia, which can simply be defined as fear of Islam. Historically speaking, 
fear of Islam has developed in Europe since the 7th century.12 Since Islam 
emerged in Arabia, the fear of Islam has frequently been referred to as the 
“orientalist’s” vision of the Arab world.13 Meanwhile, Ogan, Christine; 
Lars; Pennington, & Manaf  noted that fear of Islam emerged within most 
of the Christian population in Europe since immigrants from Muslim 
countries began arriving to Europe in the early period of the 14th century.14 
Islamophobia is, thus, a concept that emerged within the context of 
changing and dynamic cultural, political, and social relations. This is why 
Galiie has long since mentioned that Islamophobia as a concept is basically 
contested by numerous disciplines of science.15 As a result, Islamophobia 
is attributed many definitions and explanations based on the field of 
science/knowledge making use of it, without any mutual consensus on 
how it should actually be defined.
Moosavi considers Islamophobia as a form of stereotyping against 
Muslims because it is a product brought about by the meeting of two 
12Giulia Evolvi, “Hate in a Tweet: Exploring Internet-Based Islamophobic Discourses”, 
Religions, Volume 9, Number 10 (2018), 1-14.
13Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin, 2003.  
14Christine Ogan, Lars Willnat, Rosemary Pennington and Manaf Bashir, “The Rise of anti-
Muslim prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States”,  International 
Communication Gazette, Volume 76, Number 1 (2014), 27-46.
15Walter B, Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Volume 56 (1995), 167–198.
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or more differing cultures.16 Meanwhile, Kunst, Sam, and Ulleberg see 
Islamophobia as a form of fear of Islam or the Muslim community.17 
Imhoff and Recker, on the other hand, construe Islamophobia as a form of 
prejudice with a negative tendency against Muslims.18 Meer and Modood 
describe Islamophobia as one of the forms of racism based on religious 
differences.19 A broader understanding that accommodates the various 
definitions above is proposed by Bleich,20 who defines Islamophobia 
as “indiscriminative negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam 
or Muslims,”including “aversion, jealousy, suspicion, disdain, anxiety, 
rejection, contempt, fear, disgust, anger, and hostility”.21 
The elaboration Bleich  provides on Islamophobia, which is quite 
extensive, indicates that the concept of Islamophobia exists within a time 
and space that is different, dynamic, and ever-changing on account of 
the various religious, cultural, political and social relations that ensue. 
Consequently, in practice, the concept of Islamophobia also appears in a 
variety of differing forms. However, forms of Islamophobic behaviors can 
be identified as explicit and implicit Islamophobia.22 
16Leon Moosavi, “The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences 
of Islamophobia”, Critical Sociology, Volume 41, Number 1 (2015), 41–56.
17Jonas R. Kunst, David L. Sam and Pal Ulleberg,  “Perceived Islamophobia: Scale 
Development and Validation”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Volume. 37, 
Number 2 (2013),  225–237.
18Roland Imhoff and Julia Recker, “Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New 
Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique”, Political Psychology, Volume 
33, Number 6 (2012), 811-824.
19Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Patterns of Prejudice Refutations of Racism in the 
Muslim Question”, Patterns of Prejudice, Volume 43, Number  3-4 (2009), 335–354.
20Erik Bleich, “What is Islamophobia and How Much is There? Theorizing and Measuring 
an Emerging Comparative Concept”, American Behavioral Scientist , Volume 55, Number 12 
(2011), 1581–1600. 
21Erik Bleich, “Defining and Researching Islamophobia”, Review of Middle East Studies, 
Volume 46, Number 2 (2012),180-189.
22Kevin L. Nadal, et al., “Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia: Microaggressions 
toward Muslim Americans”, Journal of Muslim Mental Health, Volume 6, Number 2 (2012), 
16-37; Thomas F. Pettigrew and Roel W. Meertens, “Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western 
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A different explanation on Islamophobia is presented by Runnymede 
Trust. Islamophobia is defined as “unfounded hostility toward Islam.” 23 
This definition places the Muslim community and individuals outside 
of political and social affairs as its main underlying context. It raised 
differences between the concept of Islamophobia and legitimate criticism 
toward Islam and Muslims.
These differences subsequently led to open and closed perspectives 
on Islam and Muslims. The open perspective is a form of constructive 
criticism of the various practices of Islamic belief. The criticisms would 
then generate constructive debates within a democratic society. This 
perspective sees Islamophobia as a form of fear of Islam due to the lack 
of knowledge about Islam. 
As for the closed perspective, it is based on negative prejudice 
and hostility toward Islam and the Muslim community. According to 
Runnymede Trust, such closed perspective underlies the emergence of 
Islamophobia. Closed perspective emerges in 8 forms: monolithic, sparate, 
inferior, enemy, manipulative, criticism of the West rejected offhandedly, 
discriminatory, Islamophobia is viewed as natural.24
The eight categories from the closed perspectives of Islam and Muslims 
serve as the basis for Islamophobia to emerge. These various closed views 
do not allow any room for discussion and debate about Islam and Muslims 
as observed in the open views. According to Runnymede Trust, each of 
the perspectives may emerge on its own as a form of Islamophobia or they 
may come together and mutually stimulate one another.25 The process 
Europe”, European Journal of Social Psychology, Volume 25, Number 1 (1995), 57–75.
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may exacerbate Islamophobia, making it more expansive and more quickly 
disseminated. This is why Islamophobia is such a daunting concept to 
define. 
The understanding about and development of Islamophobia is by no 
means separable from the dynamics of global politics. Islamophobia has 
explicitly emerged since the 9/11 incident in 2001 in America, which is 
closely related to the global war against terrorism, instilling a negative 
impact on the public’s perception of Islam.26 Cainkar found that following 
the 9/11 event, Muslims across America experienced hatred, with women 
experiencing twice as much hatred.27  Ultimately, the 9/11 event has 
resulted in an anti-Muslim attitude in numerous countries.28 A similar 
atmosphere was observed in Indonesia following the 1st Bali bombing 
in 2002 and the 2nd Bali bombing in 2005, the Australian Embassy 
bombing in Jakarta in 2004, and the JW Marriot hotel and Ritz Carlton 
hotel bombings in Jakarta in 2009.29 
The situation has become increasingly difficult as the mass media also 
presented negative views of Islam.30 Subsequently, according to Stack 
(2017), Islamophobia has recently achieved new height during the 2016 
US presidential election, which was won by Donald Trump. Seven days 
after the election, the Trump administration issued a travel ban to seven 
majority-Muslim countries. 31 As a result, Islam’s negative image has 
26Naved Bakali, Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Racism Through the Lived Experiences 
of Muslim Youth, Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2016.
27A. Louise Cainkar, Homeland Insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim American experience 
after 9/11, New York: Russsel Sage Foundation, 2011.
28Steve Garner  and Saher Selod, “The Racialization of Muslims: Empirical Studies of 
Islamophobia”, Critical Sociology, Volulme 41, Number 1 (2015), 9-19. 
29Moordiningsih, Islamophobia dan Strategi Mengatasinya, Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah 
Mada, 2004. 
30Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, Muslims and the News Media, London: I.B.Tauris, 
2014.
31Liam Stack, “Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration: What We Know and What We 
Don’t”, Retrieved on September 29, 2018 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/
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only become more pronounced. According to the Pew Research Center, 
Americans considered Muslims as the most negative in comparison to 
other religious groups. 32 This explains that Islamophobia has social and 
political contexts.33 
The emergence of Islamophobia: the context of social media 
In the Indonesian context, several Islamophobic contents were also 
distributed via social media. This is made even more possible and 
unrestricted since social media activities may be conducted by disguising 
the identity of the user through the use of anonymous accounts. 
Pseudonymous or anonymous accounts are fake account names or aliases 
used on social media. According to Erjavec and Kovacic, both credible 
and pseudonymous accounts may promote positive contents, yet it may 
also be employed to disseminate negative contents such as hate speeches.34 
These sorts of contents may also provoke other reactive hate comments.
The use of anonymous accounts may weaken or remove control over 
the distributed Islamophobic contents.35 This means that the true identity 
of a netizen could not be openly known if that individual were using 
trump-refugee-ban-muslim-executive-order.html
32Pew Research Center, “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but 
Continue to Believe in the American Dream, ” Pew Research Center. Religion and Public Life, 
2017. Retrieved on April 23, 2019 at: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/7/2017/07/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf
33Khaled A Beydoun, American Islamophobia …..
34Karmen Erjavec and Melita Poler Kovac ̌ic, “You Don’t Understand, This is a New War: 
Analysis of Hate Speech in News Web Sites’ Comments”, Mass Communication and Society, 
Volume 15, Number 6 (2012), 899-920. 
35John A. Bargh and Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, “The Internet and Social Life”, Annual Review 
of Psychology, Volume 55 (2004), 573-590; Julie Blair, “New Breed of Bullies Torment Their 
Peers on the Internet”, Education Week, Volume 22, Number 21 (2003), 6-7; Danielle Keats 
Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016; Ernest VE. 
Hodges and David G. Perry, “Personal and Interpersonal Antecedents and Consequences of 
Victimization by Peers”, Journal of Personality Social Psychology, Volume 76, Number 4 (1999), 
677-685. 
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anonymous accounts in their social media activities. This results in an 
unrestricted freedom to produce Islamophobic contents. Hence, every 
netizen intending to produce Islamophobic contents via social media does 
not see the need to control what they want to express. Consequently, the 
process of echo chambers being created on social media becomes a lot 
faster. Netizens reading the contents can be more easily upset when reading 
Islamophobic contents rather than choosing to investigate who owns the 
social media account. For that reason, internet-based social media does 
provide significant opportunities as a space to disseminate cyber hatred.36
This study found that four of the most popular social media platforms, 
which are Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter, have been used to spread 
Islamophobic contents in Indonesia. The four major social media platforms were 
determined by referring to survey results obtained by APJII (2019) concerning 
the behavior of internet users in Indonesia. The survey report states that as many 
as 50.7% of netizens visit Facebook in their activities on social media. This is 
then followed by Instagram with 17.8%, YouTube 15%, and Twitter 1.7%.37
36Karuppannan Jaishankar, “Cyber Hate: Antisocial Networking in the Internet”, 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology, Volume 2, Number 2 (2008), 16-20.
37Assosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (APJII), “Laporan Survei Penetrasi & 
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Islamophobic contents on the four social media platforms may be 
categorized as strong Islamophobia. According to Vidgen and Yasseri, 
strong Islamophobia is defined as “speech which explicitly expresses 
negativity against all Muslims”.38 Some examples of strong Islamophobic 
contents found on the four social media platforms, among others, are:
Table 1: Examples of strong Islamophobic hate speech content on social 







Facebook “Islam itu agama binatang” (Islam is a 
beast religion).
Gious Nainggolan
“Ini namanya orang Islam gila. Kontol 
sama kalian, jancok” (These Muslims are 
crazy. Fuck you, you dicks).
Candra Krismon
Instagram “Kenapa rupanya kalo bendera tauhid 
dibakar? Tuhan kalian ikutterbakar 
rupanya? Makanya,jangan banyak kali 
ikut pengajianyang ngajarkan budaya, jadi 
tololbangsad Tuhan kalian aja antengdiatas 
lagi gitaran sambil mabukamer dan nulis 
puisi bokep, klenpulak yang sibuk” (What’s 
wrong with burning the tauhid flag? Is 
your God burned along with it? That’s 
why, don’t attend Muslim forums that 
teach culture, you become stupid, you 
sons of bitches. Instead, your God 
remains calm up there playing the guitar, 
drunk on red wine and writing porn 
poetry, while you all get worked up).
Rezahardiansyah7071
38Bertie Vidgen and Taha Yasseri, ”Detecting Weak and Strong Islamophobic Hate Speech 
on Social Media”, retrieved on September 27, 2018 at https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10400








YouTube “Islam adalah ajaran sesat. Yang disembah 
itu apa? Nabi Muhammad itu siapa? 
Kan sama seperti manusia juga” (Islam 
is a heretical teaching. What is being 
worshipped? Who is the Prophet 
Muhammad? Isn’t he the same, a 
human as well)
Jesicoplax
Twitter “Setelah Nabi & Tuhan GADUNGAN 
dipahami masyarakat luas, yang masih 
JUAL ayat Allah SWT & Hadis 
Muhammad, adalah PENIPU” (Once 
the FAKE God & Prophet are known 
by the wider public, those who still 
PROMOTE the verses of Allah SWT & 
the hadith of Muhammad are LIARS).
@hikdun
“Islam berdiri di atas dasar yang PASTI 
SALAH, lihat hasilnya, mulai dari 
Muslim yang tak produktif sampai 
TERORIS Islam” (Islam stands above 
a DEFINITELY ERRONEOUS basis, 
look at the results, from unproductive 
Muslims to Islamic TERRORISTS).
In general, the various existing social media have the following features: 
textual (hyper textual), interactional (hyper interactional), transactional, 
virtual, fake, mediation, and ostentatious.39 Given those social media 
attributes, Islamophobic contents on the four social media platforms that 
people use may be reproduced and redistributed across channels among 
the other social media platforms. Such a social media feature is considered 
39Martin Lister, et al., New Media: a Critical Introduction, London: Routledge, 2010.
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by Wood and Smith  to be  a prosumer (producer and consumer).40
In terms of sentence and word choices used in the contents of various 
religious hate speeches, they are described by Pohjonen and Udupa as 
extreme speech,41 whereas in terms of social media as a communication 
channel utilized to distribute Islamophobic  contents, social media may 
be construed as a powerful tool for spreading Islamophobia. Having such 
power, social media may play an extremely crucial role in managing activities 
on social media and its relations with Muslim identity or Islamophobia.42 
Islamophobia as a reaction, expression, and identity politics
Referring to the aforementioned Table 1, this study found a new category 
in the format of Islamophobic contents delivered via social media. The 
Islamophobia that emerged in the various speeches found on social media 
is a form of hatred toward Islam as a belief or teaching. This category of 
Islamophobia is unlike the two categories of Islamophobia presented by 
Vidgen and Yasseri (2018), who categorize Islamophobia into explicit and 
implicit Islamophobias, while Bleich (2012) categorizes Islamophobia into 
strong and weak. Both of them define the concept of Islamophobia by 
referring to Muslims as followers of Islam, be it as individuals, as a group, 
or a Muslim community.
40Andrew F. Wood and Matthew J. Smith, Online Communication: Linking, Technology, 
Identity, and Culture, New York and London: Routledge, 2017.
41Matti Pohjonen and Sahana Udupa, “Extreme Speech Online: A Anthropological 
Critique of Hate Speech Debates”, International Journal of Communication, Volume 11 (2017), 
1173–1191.  
42Rusi Jaspal and Marco Cinnirella, “Media Representations of British Muslims and 
Hybridised Threats to Identity”, Contemporary Islam, Volume 4, Number 3 (2010), 289-310; 
Nabil Echchaibi, “Muslimah Media Watch: Media Activism and Muslim Choreographies 
of Social Change”, Journalism, Volume 14, Number 7 (2013), 852-867; Aparna Hebbani 
and Charise-Rose Wills, “How Muslim Women in Australia Navigate through Media (Mis) 
Representations of Hijab/Burqa”, Australian Journal of Communication, Volume 39, Number 
1 (2012): 87-100; Anne Aly, “Fear Online: Seeking Sanctuary in Online Forums”, in Anna 
Hayes and Robert Mason (ed), Cultures in Refuge: Seeking Sanctuary in Modern Australia, 
Farnham : Ashgate, 2012: 163-178.
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Meanwhile, this study found that Islamophobic contents were directed 
at the belief and teachings of Islam, not at Muslims as followers of Islam. 
The idea is interesting given that this happened in Indonesia where the 
majority of its population are Muslims, which explains that Islamophobia 
has numerous aspects that are interrelated or associated with various new 
elements that have not been revealed.
This study found that it is the opposite of that, where Islamophobic 
hate speeches are directed at Islamic belief or teachings. Based on this 
argument, we affirm that hatred against Islamic teachings or belief that 
is delivered openly through various social media platforms may emerge 
because of the following reasons:
First, it is a reaction to religious sermons conveyed by Muslim clerics 
who discredit other religions, especially Christianity. This refers to a 
discussion on how Islamophobic contents delivered via social media 
directed at Islamic teachings and belief are considered as a reaction to 
sermons presented by Islamic group(s) that are often identified as radical 
or fundamental Islamic group(s), such as FPI (Islamic Defenders Front). 
In one of his speeches, the Grand Imam of FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab 
stated the following, “He even said, Habib Rizieq, Merry Christmas. What 
does it mean? Happy birthday Jesus Christ the son of God. I responded, 
‘Lam yalid walam yulad’, He neither begat nor was begotten. If God gave 
birth, who would be the midwife? ”This speech was uploaded by a netizen 
under the account name of Zetro Media onto the social media YouTube.43 
The video of that speech subsequently went viral on social media as it 
contains hate speech directed toward the Christian faith. Such religious 
sermon may become a trigger for Islamophobia directed at the sacred 
teachings and belief of Islam to emerge.
43Zetro Media, Habib Rizieq, “Kalau Tuhan beranak bidannya siapa?”, Retrieved on 
December 29, 2018 from ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7LdbSDPRg4
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Second, it is a form of freedom of expression for netizens in Indonesia’s 
democratic climate. This refers to a discussion on how Islamophobic 
contents delivered via social media directed at Islamic belief or teachings 
are considered to be  a form of freedom of expression. These are two things 
that have long become a dilemma for countries that adhere to democracy.44 
On the one hand, the state must guarantee freedom of expression for its 
citizens and, on the other hand, there are certain issues (like religion) that 
must be protected from various forms of insult.
Given the argument that religious followers as citizens have the rights to 
protect their religion as something sacred, freedom of expression that leads 
to insulting religious teachings or belief should be restricted. Protecting 
one’s religion is even suggested in the teaching of Islam (see the Qur’an, 
As-Saff: 14). 
In the Indonesian context, Islamophobic contents delivered via social 
media directed at Islamic teachings and belief contain imminent danger 
that threatens social order. Some Muslim community groups have in fact 
been reported by a number of mass media to have sought, found, and 
reported to the police netizens who produced and distributed Islamophobia 
in their various social media accounts.45 According to Fauzi, Bagir and 
Rafsadi, insult directed toward religion (Islam) in Indonesia has indeed 
caught the attention of Indonesian Muslims as the majority.46
Third, it is a form of identity politics maintained by netizens on social 
media, which is the result of religion-based political polarization. This refers 
44Toni M. Massaro, “Equality and Freedom of Expression: A Hate Speech Dilemma”, 
William & Mary Law Review, Volume 32, Number 2 (1991), 211-265. 
45Nafiysul Qodar, “Polisi tangkap pemilik akun @reza_hardiansyah_7071 yang hina 
Islam”, 2018, Merdeka.com. Retrieved on February 23, 2019 from https://www.merdeka.com/
peristiwa/polisi-tangkap-pemilik-akun-rezahardiansyah7071-yang-hina-islam.html
46Ihsan Ali Fauzi, Zainal Abidin Bagir and Irsyad Rafsadi, Kebebasan, Toleransi Dan 
Terorisme; Riset Dan Kebijakan Agama Di Indonesia, Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi 
Yayasan Paramadina, 2017. 
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 2, December 2020: 247-270
262
to a discussion on how Islamophobic contents delivered via social media 
are considered an expressive form of hate politics emerging from religious 
identity. According to Syahputra (2017), the polarization is formed in three 
stages within a climate of liberal virtual democracy (social media). The 
liberalization of virtual democrazy has propelled social media awareness to 
become a power of change, established a polarization of netizens between 
the conservative group (Islam) and the liberal group (nationalist), and has 
sociologically motivated mass protests to happen, which were conducted 
repeatedly with exceedingly large number of multitudes. 47
The discussion in this section can begin from the rise of the Islamism 
and Salafism movements as a form of Islamic conservatism movement 
in Indonesia. According to Wildan, the effect of Islamism and Salafism 
ideology has spread far and wide throughout Indonesia, which was initially 
recognized as having a tolerant and polite Islamic countenance.48 One of 
the prominent elements in Islamism and Salafism is the political movement 
to implement and uphold Islamic law. The proposal to implement 
Islamic law allegedly originated from a radical Islam group.49 According 
to Bruinessen (2002), the radical Islam group constantly employ jihad as 
a discourse to mobilize their followers.50 
The Islamism and Salafism movement recently emerged and 
reconsolidated as it was triggered by the Defend Islam Rallies, which were 
47Iswandi Syahputra, “Demokrasi Virtual dan Perang Siber di Media Sosial: Perspektif 
Netizen Indonesia”, Jurnal ASPIKOM, Volume 3, Number 3 (2017), 457-475. 
48Muhammad Wildan, “Aksi Damai 411-212, Kesalehan Populer, dan Identitas Muslim Perkotaan 
Indonesia”, Maarif, Volume 11, Number 2 (2016), 188-202.
49Edward  Aspinall, “Elections and the Normalization of Politics in Indonesia.” South 
East Asia Research, Volume 13, Number 2 (2005), 117–156; Marcus Mietzner, “Comparing 
Indonesia’s Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Soeharto Era: From Centrifugal to 
Centripetal Inter-Party Competition”,  Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 39, Number 
3  (2008), 431–453. 
50Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, 
South East Asia Research, Volume 10, Number 2 (2002), 117-154.
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held numerous times and attended by millions of people. These mass 
protests were a reaction to the blasphemy against Islam perpetrated by 
the then Governor of Jakarta SCR, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (commonly 
known as Ahok) in one of his speeches. The Defend Islam Rallies were 
initiated by FPI and supported by other Islamic groups. 51 Although the 
recurrent massive protests were conducted to defend Islam from blasphemy, 
they were inseparable from the interests of identity politics because these 
protests were held during the period leading up to the 2017 Jakarta 
SCR Gubernatorial Election and continued up to the 2019 Presidential 
Election. 
The recurring Defend Islam Rallies were successfully held on account 
of the growing democratic climate in Indonesia and the power that social 
media and netizens’ activities in them had.52 Hence, it is plausible that 
such democratic context and intensity of social media activities has allowed 
various ideas, teachings, and expressions to be challenged, tested, or even 
opposed.53 Under such a context, anyone is able to berate one another 
or spread hatred on social media. According to Suller  every netizen may 
convey things on social media that they would never do in their actual 
daily life. 54
To some Muslim residents of Jakarta, the Defend Islam Rallies did 
not stand alone as merely being triggered by the religious blasphemy 
51Mark Woodward and Amanah Nurish, “Quo Vadis FPI dalam Aksi Bela Islam“,Maarif, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 (2016): 105-122; Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan 
Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan”, Maarif, Volume 11, Number 2 (2016),15-29.
52Muzayyin Ahyar and Alfitri, “Aksi Bela Islam: Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority 
of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia”, Indonesian Journal of Islam and 
Muslim Societies, Volume 9, Number 1 (2019), 1-29; Iswandi Syahputra, “Media Sosial dan 
Prospek Muslim Kosmopolitan: Konstruksi & Peran Masyarakat Siber pada Aksi Bela Islam”, 
Jurnal Komunikasi Islam, Volume 8, Number 1 (2018),19-40.
53Daniel Trottier and Christian Fuchs, Social Media, Politics and the State: Protest, Revolutions, 
Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, New York: Routledge, 2015.
54John Suler, “The Online Disinhibition Effect”, Cyberpsychology and Behavior, Vol. 7, No. 
3 (2004), 321-325. 
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perpetrated by the former Governor of Jakarta SCR, Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama (Ahok). The rallies were an accumulation of various political 
pressures experienced by some of the Muslim communities in Jakarta 
through Ahok’s policies as the Governor of Jakarta SCR. They considered 
Ahok’s policies Governor who is unfair to the Muslim communities in 
Jakarta. Some of the policies that were deemed detrimental to the Muslim 
community as the majority and that became controversies, for example, 
were prohibiting Muslims to hold takbiran (recital of God’s greatness) 
in public around the city to celebrate Eid al-Fitr55, prohibiting Muslim 
residents to slaughter sacrificial animals on school grounds to celebrate 
Eid al-Adha,56 or allowing restaurants to remain open when Muslims were 
observing their holy month of Ramadan.57
The various relations among influences of ideology, politics, power, 
identity, religious authority, and mass rallies have subsequently become a 
discourse for netizens on various social media channels. The conversation 
dynamics within such a context have consequently brought about 
Islamophobic contents delivered via social media, which is an expressive 
form of hate politics derived from religious identity. Thus, the emergence of 
Islamophobic contents disseminated via netizens’ activities on social media 
in the Indonesian context is not only driven by hate, fear, or misperception 
about Islam or Muslims, but it is also affected by the practice of religion-
based identity politics.  
55Wahyu Sabda Kuncahyo, “Tolak Larangan Ahok, PPP Gelar Takbir Keliling”. Retrieved 
on February 25, 2019 from http://nusantara.rmol.co/read/2016/07/05/252300/Tolak-
Larangan-Ahok,-PPP-Gelar-Takbir-Keliling-
56Yuanita, “Ahok Larang Pemotongan Hewan Kurban di Sekolah”. Retrieved on February 
24, 2019 from http://metro.sindonews.com/read/1042040/171/ ahok-larang-pemotongan-
hewan-kurban-di-sekolah-1441692072
57Fakhri Fakhrizal, “Ahok Izinkan Rumah Makan Buka Selama Ramadan”. Retrieved on 
February 23, 2019 from http://news.okezone.com/read/2015/06/17/338/ 1166741/ ahok-
izinkan-rumah-makan-buka-selama-ramadan
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Conclusion
The delivery of Islamophobic hate speech via social media in the 
Indonesian context may be analyzed into three divisions. First, it is a 
reaction to religious sermons made by Muslim clerics who discredit other 
religions, particularly Christianity. Second, it is a form of freedom of 
expression for netizens within Indonesia’s democratic climate. Third, it is 
a form of netizens’ identity politics on social media caused by the impact 
of religion based political polarization. 
The context and relation of the three factors above explains that 
Islamophobia may also happen in countries where the majority of its 
population are Muslims. The understanding of Islamophobia in this 
context can, thus, be taken as a new perspective in understanding the 
dynamics of Islamophobia that has been developing through the Western 
perspective. Theoretically speaking, the study may have implications on 
new understanding of interreligious tolerance in the context of new media 
presence in democratic countries, such as Indonesia. Hence, the study 
results may practically be utilized by religious followers and figures in their 
religious activities, particularly on social media. 
The research has a methodological limit as it lacks appropriate 
technological tools to detect Islamophobic contents or the use of robot 
accounts in spreading Islamophobia on social media. This leads to further 
questions as to why the spread of Islamophobia on social media uses 
anonymous or robot accounts. Can this trigger violent interreligious clashes 
on social media? These issues may be taken up as the focus of future studies 
by using technological tools that are based on big data. 
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